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We show how on-the-job search and the propagation of shocks to the economy are
intricately linked. Rising search by employed workers in a boom ampliﬁes the in-
centives of ﬁrms to post vacancies. In turn, more vacancies induce more on-the-job
search. By keeping job creation costs low for ﬁrms, on-the-job search greatly ampliﬁes
shocks. In our baseline calibration, this allows the model to generate ﬂuctuations of
unemployment, vacancies, and labor productivity whose magnitudes are close to the
data, and leads output to be highly autocorrelated.
Keywords:
Search and matching, job-to-job mobility, worker ﬂows, Beveridge curve, business
cycle, propagation
JEL-Classiﬁcation:
E24, E32, J64Non-technical summary
Models with search frictions in the labor market cannot replicate the cyclical dynam-
ics of vacancies and unemployment, even though these are central elements of such
models. In particular, under realistic calibrations, one can explain the volatilities of
these variables only with implausibly large shocks. The reason is that in a boom
wage pressures rise strongly when the number of unemployed job searchers falls. This
in turn reduces the incentives for ﬁrms to open new vacancies. One solution to this
problem is to assume real wage rigidity, as proposed by Hall (2005), such that labor
demand stays high in a boom. However, this leaves open the question why such real
wage rigidity should arise in the ﬁrst place.
This paper proposes a simple solution to this puzzle, without the need to assume
ad hoc real wage rigidity. We introduce the possibility that also employed workers
search for jobs, so that vacancies can be ﬁlled with employees of other, less productive,
ﬁrms that pay lower wages. In a boom, rising search activity by employed workers
expands the pool of potential hires for ﬁrms, in addition to those searching from
unemployment. This in turn reinforces the incentives to post vacancies by ﬁrms. But
since all job searchers compete more strongly for the available vacancies, the wages
of incumbent and newly hired workers rise much less than in the standard model.
To make this argument precise and to assess it quantitatively, we develop a stan-
dard general equilibrium business cycle model with search frictions in the labor mar-
ket. Search on the job is motivated in a straightforward manner by the presence
of two types of jobs, which dier in the return to working. Workers in jobs that
pay lower wages search in order to gain employment in high-paying jobs. Wages are
determined by Nash bargaining for each matched job-worker unit and continuously
renegotiated. We calibrate the model to match salient long-run empirical features of
job and worker ﬂows, such as average separation and quit rates.
Our model can correctly predict the observed high volatility vacancies and unem-
ployment, as well as of the vacancy-unemployment ratio. At the same time, the ratio
of vacancies to unemployed and employed job seekers is substantially less volatile than
in the standard model, which is key to wage dynamics. Thus wages are less volatile.
In a boom, job-to-job ﬂows increase substantially. But as search on the job rises,
and ﬁrms’ wage and hiring cost increases are muted, the incentive to create vacan-
cies remains high. Employed workers’ search activity responds strongly to a positive
aggregate shock to take advantage of the increased availability of good employmentopportunities. The resulting fall in unemployment is large. This is achieved even
though productivity shocks are of plausible magnitude and wages are, a priori, fully
ﬂexible. The model also predicts a vacancy chain in that replacement hiring for bad
jobs rises with quits.
This mechanism has important implications for business cycle analysis and mon-
etary policy transmission. There is a powerful internal propagation mechanism, in
that small aggregate impulses engender large and long-lasting responses of output
and employment. This propagation is intricately linked with the complementarity
between on-the-job search and vacancy creation. To the extent that labor costs in-
clude both wages and the costs of ﬁnding workers, on-the-job search delivers much
lower volatility of real marginal costs in New Keynesian monetary models with mo-
nopolistic price setting. The sluggish response of wages and labor-market tightness
that we ﬁnd in the model will thus lead to more persistent movements in inﬂation.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Modelle mit Suchfriktionen im Arbeitsmarkt können die in den Daten beobachtete
zyklische Volatilität von oenen Stellen und Arbeitslosigkeit quantitativ nicht wieder-
geben, obwohl dies zentrale Elemente dieser Modelle sind. Insbesondere kann man
unter realistischer Kalibrierung diese Volatilitäten nur mit sehr großen, wenig plau-
siblen Schocks erklären. Die Ursache ist, dass in diesen Modellen im Aufschwung
der Lohndruck stark zunimmt, wenn die Anzahl der Arbeitsuchenden fällt. Damit
fällt jedoch auch der Anreiz für Firmen, neue Stellen zu schaen. Somit kann der
Arbeitsmarkt nicht stark reagieren. Eine Lösung ist, wie Hall (2005), anzunehmen,
dass Löhne rigide sind, und somit die Arbeitsnachfrage im Boom länger hoch bleibt.
Diese Annahme ist allerdings ad hoc.
Dieses Diskussionspapier schlägt eine einfache aber fundamentale Erweiterung des
Modells vor, mit der auf die Annahme rigider Löhne verzichtet werden kann und den-
noch die Daten erklärt werden. Wir berücksichtigen, dass neue oene Stellen auch
mit bereits Beschäftigten anderer Firmen besetzt werden können. Wenn also in einem
Aufschwung die Nachfrage nach Arbeitkräften steigt, können produktive Firmen Ar-
beiter von weniger produktiven Firmen abwerben. Gleichzeitig haben Beschäftige
den Anreiz, intensiver nach besseren Jobs zu suchen. Diese beiden Eekte verstärken
sich gegenseitig. Da aber alle Jobsuchenden verstärkt um oene Stellen konkurrieren,
steigen die Löhne weniger stark an als wenn nur Arbeitlose dem Arbeitsmarkt zur
Verfügung stehen.
Um dieses Argument zu präzisieren und quantitativ zu bewerten, entwickeln wir
ein Konjunkturmodell mit Suchfriktionen im Arbeitsmarkt. Zentral ist die Annahme
zweier Jobtypen, die sich in ihrer Produktivität, und damit auch Löhnen, unter-
scheiden. Arbeitnehmer auf einem ‘schlechten’ Arbeitsplatz haben den Anreiz, nach
einem ‘guten’ Arbeitsplatz zu suchen. Die Löhne werden unter der Annahme der
Nash-Verhandlungslösung als völlig ﬂexibel angenommen. Wir kalibrieren das Mod-
ell so, dass langfristige Beziehungen in den Daten abgebildet werden, wie zum Beispiel
die Zerstörungsrate von Arbeitsplätzen und die Anzahl der Arbeiter, die im Schnitt
ihren Job wechseln.
Das Modell erzeugt eine realistisch hohe Volatilität von Vakanzen und Arbeit-
slosigkeit, sowie von deren Verhältnis. Gleichzeitig ist das Verhältnis von Vakanzen
und Jobsuchenden (die aus Arbeitslosen und beschäftigten Arbeitssuchenden beste-
hen) wesentlich stabiler als im Modell ohne Jobsuche der Beschäftigten. Da aber dieseGröße für die Lohnsetzung zentral ist, sind auch die Löhne weniger zyklisch, und die
Anreize von Firmen, neue Stellen anzubieten, bleiben über einen Aufschwung länger
hoch. Dies wird durch die erhöhte Suchintensität der Beschäftigten weiter verstärkt.
Ein weiteres zentrales Ergebnis des Modells ist, dass in einem Boom die Wanderung
von Job zu Job ansteigt; die Arbeitslosigkeit fällt stark. Dies wird auch in den Daten
beobachtet. Es entsteht eine Kettenreaktion: da freigewordene Stellen wiederbesetzt
werden müssen, steigt auch die Zahl der Vakanzen für ‘schlechte’ Jobs.
Dieser Mechanismus hat wichtige Implikationen für den Konjunkturzyklus und
die Transmission der Geldpolitik. Die Eekte von Schocks werden im Modell ver-
stärkt und halten lange an, im Gegensatz zum Standardmodell ohne Jobsuche der
Beschäftigten. Da die realen Grenzkosten der Firmen von Löhnen und Suchkosten
abhängen, ergibt sich mit ‘on-the-job search’ eine wesentlich geringere Volatilität und
höhere Persistenz der Grenzkosten. Dies impliziert wiederum eine wesentlich persis-
tentere Inﬂation, insbesondere in neukeynesianischen Modellen der Geldpolitik.Contents
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of the Labor Market1
1 Introduction
Research starting with Hall (2005), Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2005)
shows that the search and matching models along the lines of Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994) can explain the cyclical dynamics of the labor market only by assum-
ing implausibly large productivity shocks. For reasonable calibrations, the standard
framework underpredicts the volatility of vacancies and unemployment. Both Hall
and Shimer explore real wage rigidity as a solution to this shortcoming. With this
element, ﬁrms’ incentives to create new jobs in a boom are kept high since workers
do not share the returns through bargaining. Hence, more vacancies are posted, and
unemployment falls. This argument rests on the fact that the vacancy-unemployment
ratio enters the wage equation, reﬂecting workers’ outside options. Thus, when wages
are not rigid, but continuously renegotiated, they are excessively volatile.2
We show in this paper that on-the-job search oers a resolution to this puzzle.
In a boom, rising search activity by employed workers expands the pool of potential
hires for ﬁrms, in addition to those searching from unemployment. As a consequence,
the bargaining power of incumbent and newly hired workers rises by much less than
would be implied by the standard vacancy-unemployment ratio. Wages exhibit less
volatility than in the standard model.
1Authors’ a!liation: Michael Krause, Deutsche Bundesbank, Economic Research Center,
Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14, D-60431 Frankfurt, Germany. Tel.: +49(0)69 9566-2382. Fax: +49(0)69
9566-3082. Email: michael.u.krause@bundesbank.de.
Thomas Lubik, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economics Department, 701 East Byrd Street,
Richmond, VA 23261. Tel.: +1 804 697-8246. Email: thomas.lubik@rich.frb.org
Part of this research was conducted while the second author was visiting the Department of Eco-
nomics at Tilburg University, whose hospitality is gratefully ackowledged. We thank Jan Boone,
Heinz Herrmann, Winfried Koeniger, Jan van Ours, and in particular Robert Hussey and James
Nason for comments and discussions. Special thanks go to Eva Nagypal for extensive comments on
the 2004 version of this paper which helped improve the exposition. We also received useful com-
ments from seminar participants at the 2004 Econometric Society Summer Meetings in Providence,
the Society of Computational Economics Conference in Amsterdam, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, the EEA/ESEM meetings in Madrid, Deutsche Bundesbank, the SED 2005 meetings in
Budapest, and Tilburg University. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, the Federal Reserve System or the Deutsche Bundesbank.
2Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005), Fujita and Ramey (2005), and Rotemberg (2006), among
others, explore alternative mechanisms.
1To develop this argument, we present a general equilibrium business cycle model
with labor market frictions and search by employed and unemployed workers. Search
on the job is motivated in a straightforward manner by the presence of two types of
jobs, which dier in terms of proﬁtability and thus the returns to working. Workers
in low-wage (‘bad’) jobs search in order to gain employment in high-wage (‘good’)
jobs. Good job vacancies can be matched with employed and unemployed job seek-
ers, whereas ﬁrms in the bad job sector only hire unemployed workers. Wages are
determined by Nash bargaining for each matched job-worker unit and continuously
renegotiated. We calibrate the model to match salient long-run features of job and
worker ﬂows.
Our model can correctly predict the observed volatility of the vacancy-unemploy-
ment ratio. At the same time, the ratio of vacancies to unemployed and employed
job seekers is substantially less volatile, which is key to wage dynamics. Employed
workers’ search activity responds strongly to a positive aggregate shock to take ad-
vantage of the increased availability of good employment opportunities. Job-to-job
ﬂows increase substantially. But as search on the job rises, and wage and hiring cost
increases are muted, the incentive to create vacancies remains high. The correspond-
ing fall in unemployment is large. This is achieved even though productivity shocks
are of plausible magnitude and wages are, a priori, fully ﬂexible. Moreover, on-the-
job search yields a powerful internal propagation mechanism in that small aggregate
impulses engender large and long-lasting responses of output and employment. We
show that this propagation is intricately linked with the mechanism that keeps job
creation high.
Important for the ability of the model to match the data is the interaction of
two features: the endogeneity of on-the-job search and vacancy creation. The former
maintains the incentives to create good jobs in a boom, since the likelihood of ﬁlling
a vacancy remains large, in spite of falling unemployment. The increasing availability
of good vacancies, raises employed workers’ search eort. Without either element,
the response of job-to-job transitions and the propagation of shocks on output would
be much weaker. This complementarity explains the prolonged eect of shocks. Fur-
thermore, not only are more new jobs created, but the job composition shifts towards
more productive jobs, which raises aggregate output.
The closest precursors of our model with on-the-job search are the contributions
by Pissarides (1994) and Mortensen (1994). The former studies a deterministic,
2continuous-time model and qualitatively discusses possible adjustment dynamics. It
shares the heterogeneity in job types employed in this paper. The latter conducts
a simulation of a stochastic version of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model.
Mortensen shows that on-the-job search helps explain the negative correlation be-
tween job creation and destruction rates. In both papers, employed search varies
through adjustments in the number of searchers, rather than the intensity of search.
Finally, the two papers have exogenous interest rates and prices, shutting down gen-
eral equilibrium eects, which aect the dynamics of vacancies and unemployment.
Neither of the papers considers these dynamics quantitatively. Nagypal (2005) con-
siders the implications of on-the-job search motivated by subjective perceptions of
job quality by workers. While her analysis does not include aggregate propagation ef-
fects, she also ﬁnds large dierences in vacancies and unemployment in a comparative
statics exercise.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section gives a brief discussion of the
relevant evidence on the dynamic behavior of the labor market, in particular the
quit rate. Section 3 lays out the model and characterizes the steady state. Section
4 gives the calibration details. The results of the dynamic simulation of the model
are presented in section 5, while section 6 contains further discussion and section 7
relates the ﬁndings to the literature. Section 8 concludes. The log-linearized model
and remarks on the solution procedure can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Empirical Background
This section documents the cyclical behavior of vacancies, unemployment, and labor
market tightness for the U.S. labor market and their relation to productivity, output,
employment, and real wages. While we use labor market data from 1948 until 2003,
some other series cover only a shorter period. In particular, the time series on average
hourly earnings which is only available from 1964 on and which we use as our measure
of the real wage (deﬂated by the CPI). All series are available from the website of
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov), except the series on quits, which
has been compiled from the Employment and Earnings publication of the BLS. This
series, however, is only available up to 1982, when it was discontinued. Vacancies
are constructed from the BLS index of help-wanted advertisements. All variables are
quarterly and, where appropriate, detrended using the HP-ﬁlter, with the smoothing
3parameter set to 1600.
The dynamics of vacancies and unemployment follow a familiar pattern. Fig-
ure 1 shows vacancies that are highly procyclical whereas unemployment is strongly
countercyclical; that is, the two variables exhibit a Beveridge curve with a contem-
poraneous correlation of 0=95. This pattern implies that a measure of labor mar-
ket tightness, the vacancy-unemployment ratio, is also highly procyclical. Table 1
presents the standard deviations and cross-correlations of the variables of interest.
Real wages are procyclical, the degree of which depends on the time period consid-
ered.3 Particularly the 1970s feature a highly procyclical real wage, while from the
1980s on it appears almost acyclical. In fact, for the full sample, the correlation
between output and real wages is 0=57, whereas from 1982 onward it is merely 0=26.
For consistency with the theoretical model, we take output per worker as a measure
of labor productivity, which has a correlation with output of 0=69.4
One of the central variables for the argument considered in this paper is the rate
of job-to-job mobility and quits, which we consider to be the outcome of on-the-job
search activity. Two data sets have become available recently, but they only cover
relatively short periods of time. The Job Openings and Labour Turnover Survey
(JOLTS) by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics was begun in December 2000. This
period essentially covers only one mild downturn. Since 1994, the Current Popula-
tion Survey uses a “dependent interviewing” technique which allows construction of
detailed worker ﬂow series. This series thus comprises the protracted boom of the
1990s as well as the subsequent downturn. This dataset does not allow us, however,
to infer unconditional time series properties of the data, but it is at least useful in
providing long-run averages.
A long time series on worker mobility and quits is contained in the BLS labor
turnover series for the manufacturing sector from 1926 to 1981, which we use from
1948 on. We follow Blanchard and Diamond (1989) by making two adjustments
based more recent numbers. First, quit rates in manufacturing tend to be lower than
in the entire economy and therefore need to be adjusted upwards. We use Fallick
and Fleischman’s (2004) ﬁnding based on the CPS data. They ﬁnd an economy-wide
average monthly quit rate of 2.6%. Some caution may be mandated since the data
cover only one upswing and one mild downturn. A long-run average which includes a
3These results are not reported, but available from the authors.
4Output per hour has a correlation of 0=54 with output.
4severe contraction might yield somewhat lower rates. Secondly, not all quits are job-
to-job ﬂows. Fallick and Fleischman (2004) suggest that job-to-job quits are about
half of total quits, while Blanchard and Diamond (1989) postulate 40 percent.
The standard deviation of the adjusted quit series can be found Table 1, based on
the sample up to the end of 1981. It is worth noting that the quit rate is eight times
as volatile as GDP and about 50 percent more volatile than unemployment.5 Figure
1 shows that the quit rate appears to comove with the vacancy index, especially
between about 1955 and 1975. In fact, the detrended series of vacancies and the quit
rate for the whole period have a correlation of 0.94. Increased availability of data from
the CPS and JOLTS will allow to test whether the volatilities short-run relationships
between quits, unemployment, and vacancies have signiﬁcantly changed since 1982.6
3 A Business Cycle Model with On-the-Job Search
Time is discrete and inﬁnite, and the economy is populated by a representative house-
hold, homogeneous workers and heterogeneous ﬁrms. There are two classes of ﬁrms,
labeled ‘good’ and ‘bad’, which dier in their costs of creating new jobs. In the pres-
ence of labor market frictions, these costs generate rents which give rise to dierences
across jobs in the value of being employed.7 These dierentials motivate workers in
low-wage jobs to search for employment in high-wage jobs. All workers in low-wage
jobs search on the job. The intensity of their search is endogenous. Unemployed
workers direct their search to either good jobs or bad jobs, according to the returns
to search. Workers in good jobs have no incentive to search as it is costly and does
not oer any improvements over their current returns to employment. We ﬁrst char-
acterize labor and product markets, and the aggregate household problem. We then
discuss the optimal choices by ﬁrms and workers in this environment.
3.1 The Labor Market
The process of matching workers and ﬁrms is subject to frictions, represented by a
matching function, which gives the number of per period matches of job searchers
5See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2000) for evidence on the relative magnitudes of dierent quit
ﬂows.
6See Shimer (2005) for most recent evidence.
7In this respect, the model is similar to Pissarides (1994) and Acemoglu (2001). The key elements
of the model are the heterogeneity of jobs and the endogeneity of search intensity by employed
workers.
5and vacancies. The matching function is constant returns to scale and homogeneous
of degree one. It is the same for both job types and searchers.8 For good jobs, the
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where y
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w is the measure of good job vacancies, x
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w the measure of unemployed workers
searching for good jobs, and hw = vwqe
w is the measure of e!ciency units of search
by employed job seekers qe
w, who search with intensity vw. Unemployed job seekers
are assumed to search with ﬁxed search intensity (equal to one)9. For bad jobs, the








Note that unemployed workers search in distinct pools for jobs, and have to make
a decision as to which type of job they devote their search eort. Worker mobility
implies that the returns to search for either job type are equalized.
Central to the choices of ﬁrms and workers are the probabilities of ﬁnding a match
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w taken as given by the worker. Note that
employed job seekers and unemployed job seekers cause congestion for each other in
the market for good jobs.10









8This assumption is usually based on empirical ﬁndings, such as those by Blanchard and Diamond
(1990). Note, however, that these estimates ignore the presence of job-to-job ﬂows. For a thorough
discussion of the potential biases see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
9This assumption will be relaxed below, and shown to have no substantive implications for the
results.
10This observation is consistent with empirical evidence, see for example Burgess (1995), but
also the discussion in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). In Pissarides’ (1994) model with on-the-job
search, workers cannot direct their search and are randomly matched across good and bad vacancies.
6q
e









where  is the probability of matches breaking up, which is exogenous and identical
for both types of jobs.11 It comprises both job destruction events and separations of
workers for reasons other than quits to another employer. The last term in the second







w, which is the fraction of new








For wage bargaining, we assume that a worker and a ﬁrm split in ﬁxed proportions
the joint surplus that their match generates. The surplus of job type l is given by
Vl
w = Ml
w  Y l
w + Zl
w  Xw,w h e r eMl
w is the value of a ﬁlled job for ﬁrms, Y l
w the
value of a vacancy, Zl
w is the return of working to a worker, and Xl
w is the value of
unemployment. The wage has to be such that workers obtain a share Zl
w Xw = Vl
w>
with bargaining weight 0 ??1. Firms receive the remainder Ml
w =( 1 )Vl
w.
Wages are determined by taking the search intensity of workers as given, while search
intensity itself is chosen by workers taking as given the current wage. Contracts are
renegotiated each period.
3.2 Firms and Product Markets
The cost of creating a job is represented by a ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy, fj for
good ﬁrms, and fe for bad ﬁrms, where fj Af e. Production of a (representative) ﬁrm




where Dw is aggregate productivity and ql
w is employment in sector l. Output of good






The two intermediate goods, |jw and |ew, are sold at competitively determined prices,
Sjw =( 1)(|jw@|w)
31 and Sew = (|ew@|w)
31.W eh a v ec h o s e nt h ep r i c eo fa g g r e g a t e
output as the numeraire. In the model, both types of jobs coexist in equilibrium.12
11Allowing for diering job destruction rates for good jobs would not change the basic mechanism
of the model.
12A similar product market structure is used by Acemoglu (2001). It can be interpreted as repre-
senting dierences across industries or dierences across ﬁrms within industries. Evidence by Parent
73.3 The Aggregate Household
We use a representative household to construct the discount factor that governs in-
tertemporal decisions of workers and ﬁrms. We follow Merz (1995) and others in
assuming that workers are members of a large family which pools income and then
redistributes it equally to all members. The family ensures that all workers, employed
and unemployed, participate in the labor market. Thus the optimization problem of













subject to the aggregate resource constraint:
fw = |w  kw> (8)
where 0 ??1 is the household’s discount factor, and A0 is the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. fw is consumption, |w is aggregate production
and kw = fjy
j
w +feye
w are the aggregate hiring (or job creation) costs incurred by ﬁrms.





w > which ﬁrms and workers use to evaluate their activities.
3.4 Analytical Results: Job Creation, Search Intensity, and
Wages
The optimal choices by ﬁrms and workers are governed by asset values. While the
values for good jobs and their workers are the same as in the standard search and
matching model, the values for bad jobs dier in the presence of on-the-job search.
The asset values of jobs ﬁlled with a worker are given by the Bellman equations:
M
j
w = SjwDw  z
j























w>l= j>e are the wages paid, Hw is the expectation operator conditional on the
information set at time w. Jobs survive into the next period with probability (1),
(2000), among others, indicates that a large fraction of job-to-job transitions are within industries.
This is suggestive of intra-industry dierences of jobs motivating worker mobility. Additional evi-
dence comes from Albaek and Sorensen (1998), who ﬁnd that ﬂows of workers in upturns typically
are from small ﬁrms to large ﬁrms.
8and are destroyed otherwise. Bad jobs face the additional risk of workers leaving to
good jobs. A higher search intensity by a worker reduces the likelihood of the job
remaining matched in the next period.
The value Y l

















A vacancy is ﬁlled and produces in the next period with probability tl
w(1  ).F r e e
entry implies that the values of vacancies are driven to zero at any point in time,
i.e., Y
j
w = Y e
w =0 > for all w= Solving the asset equations for vacancies yields two job
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The equations relate the expected cost of a posted vacancy to the expected beneﬁt.
To understand why this condition must hold, consider the case where fj@t
j
w ? (1 
)HwwM
j
w+1= It is then proﬁtable to post additional vacancies, y
j
w> which leads to a rise
in labor market tightness 
j




w)= Vacancies rise until no
ex-ante returns remain.
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n(vw) denotes the strictly convex cost of search intensity vw> with n(0) = 0, n0 A 0,a n d
n00 A 0. The higher the search intensity, the more likely the worker is matched with a
good job. Convexity of the eort function guarantees uniqueness of the optimal search
eort. For vw =0 > the worker either stays on the job or returns to unemployment after
an exogenous separation. Search intensity is chosen by the worker taking the wage
as given, on grounds that ﬁrms cannot directly observe the search eort of workers.
However, ﬁrms anticipate the optimal choice that workers will make in equilibrium.























from bargaining. Thus, search intensity rises with the probability of ﬁnding a good




no search would take place on bad jobs. The factor @(1  ) reﬂects the fact that
w o r k e r so b t a i no n l yas h a r eo ft h ev a l u eo faj o b . 13
The asset values of unemployed search for jobs of type l = j>e are
X
l









From worker mobility, we know that X
j
w = Xe
w = Xw> for all w= Setting the asset values




























Thus the relative labor market tightness for both types of jobs are exactly proportional
to the relative costs of job creation.
Finally, the wages paid in good and bad jobs are, respectively,
z
j











The equations are derived from the bargaining relationship (1  )(Zl
w  Xw)=Ml
w,
using the respective asset equations and the job creation conditions.14 The second
equation makes use of equation (16). The wage compensates the worker for the
incurred search cost n(vw) and compensates the ﬁrm for the increased likelihood of
separation due to the workers search eort vw=
13There is no role of the wage for reducing the likelihood of workers quitting, because of the
timing structure of the model and the nature of bargaining. Wages are continuously renegotiated
so that currently paid wages have no implications for wages paid next period, which will be newly
negotiated. But next period’s payments are what motivates worker search this period. If ﬁrms could
commit to wages for more than a period, then adjusting today’s wage would have an eect on search
intensity and thus quitting. We exclude this possibility. This also allows us to determine the wage
as an outcome to Nash bargaining, because the bargaining set is convex. The need to determine the
wage as the outcome of bargaining with alternating oers thus does not arise. See Shimer (2006)
for a careful discussion.
14We assume at this stage that wages in previous jobs are not part of the outside options of a
worker. Alternative assumptions on the wage determination of job switchers is elaborated upon in
Section 5.
104 Calibration and Model Solution
We proceed by linearizing the equation system around the non-stochastic steady
state. The resulting linear rational expectations model is then solved by the method
described in Sims (2002). To evaluate the cyclical properties of the model we assign
numerical values to the structural parameters. The calibration is somewhat more
complicated than in the standard model as aggregate statistics can not easily be
matched with corresponding model statistics. Moreover, since pertinent information
is available for some parameters, we have to compute these indirectly from the steady-
state values of quantiﬁable endogenous variables. The calibration is summarized in
Table 2.
We choose a separation rate of  =0 =1. Following the argument in Den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (2000), this value captures both exogenous job destruction as well
as quits into unemployment or movements out of the labor force. The unemployment
rate is set to 12%, i.e., x =0 =12. It is chosen higher than that commonly observed
in the data to take into account workers that are only loosely attached to the labor
force, such as discouraged workers or workers engaging in home production. Once the
opportunity arises, these (potential) workers participate in the matching market.15
We set the steady-state job-to-job transition rate to 0=06. In our model, this
corresponds to the term hsj@q, i.e. the number of workers in bad jobs who move on
to good jobs relative to total employment. This number stems from the data on job-
to-job quits as reported above. When combined with the dynamics of employment,
this implies a ratio of job-to-job movements to total hires of 54%, which is at the high
end of the empirically plausible range.
For the matching function, we choose a Cobb-Douglas form that is identical in
both sectors, so that pj = Pjy13
j (xj + h)
 and pe = Pey13
j x

e. Similarly to the
literature, the elasticity parameter is calibrated as  =0 =4.16 The level parameters
Pj, Pe are computed to imply an average ﬁrm matching probability of 0=7,w h i c h
is a commonly used value in the literature. This leads to Pj =0 =6 and Pe =0 =6.
The corresponding steady state sectoral matching rates, that is, the probability that
a ﬁrm in the good or bad sector ﬁnds an employee, are 0=77 and 0=63, respectively.
15This argument is based on Blanchard and Diamond (1990).
16Empirical estimates of this elasticity parameter are biased when there is on-the-job search (see
Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001, for the estimation). We are aware of no empirical study of the
matching function that takes on-the-job search into account.
11Job heterogeneity is generated by dierences in the job creation costs fj Af e.
Crucial as these parameters are, it is also not trivial to pin them down. We let
our choice be motivated by the following considerations. First, job creation costs
consist of costs for recruitment, training, and unused capital, which are likely to be
proportional to the capital intensity. In fact, Acemoglu (2001) links creation costs
to capital intensities in service and manufacturing sectors. We thus impose that job
creation costs for good ﬁrms are four times as large as for bad ﬁrms, which is in the
order of magnitude of the dierence between the capital intensity of average high-
wage and low-wage jobs. Secondly, even though job creation costs can be treated
as scale parameters, they should not be out of line with the general steady state
implications of the model. Speciﬁcally, they cannot be so large as to substantially
reduce aggregate GDP below production. Setting fj =0 =16 and fe =0 =04 results in
5% of output used in job creation activities and obeys the ﬁrst criterion. Furthermore,
we impose that sectoral prices are roughly equal in steady state which implies a share
 =0 =4 of production derived from bad jobs. Together with the dierential in job
creation costs, this implies that wages are higher in good jobs.
The costs of searching on the job are assumed to be strictly increasing and convex
in the search intensity. We use n(v)=v,w h e r eA0, A1. In our benchmark
calibration we choose  =1 =5. We regard highly elastic search as the most plausible
case. First, there may be increasing returns to search as argued by Rotemberg (2006).
Secondly, the model tries to explain data generated by search at both the intensive and
extensive margins.17 Note also that Merz (1995) chooses a value of one. Since this is
one of our main parameters of interest, we will present and discuss the implications of
variations in the search elasticity. The scale parameter  is not chosen independently,
but is computed implicitly to be consistent with the calibrated steady state. We ﬁnd
 =0 =04.
The parameters describing the household are standard. We choose a coe!cient of
relative risk aversion  =1 , and a discount factor  =0 =98. The worker’s share in
the surplus of the match is  =0 =5. There is no independent information available on
the utility value of household production }. Reverse calibration of the unemployment
rate, however, implies that } =0 =39, which is below wages in both sectors.
Finally, we need to calibrate the shock process. The (logarithm of the) aggregate
17Christensen et al, who estimate a search model with intensive and extensive search on the job,
ﬁnd a search elasticity of 2.
12productivity shock is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with coe!cient D =0 =90.
As is common in the literature we choose an innovation variance such that the baseline
model’s predictions match the standard deviation of U.S. GDP, which is 1=62%. While
this is not a robust procedure, it is not essential for our approach since we do not
evaluate the model along this dimension. What matters are the relative volatilities
of the variables of interest. Consequently, the standard deviation of technology is set
to % =0 =0049.
Based on this calibration, we ﬁnd that in the non-stochastic steady state equilib-
rium about 30% of jobs are bad, and that search intensity v is about one third. In
other words, 10% of the labor force are eectively searching on the job. A relatively
low number of unemployed workers look for good jobs (1=3%), while the remainder
of the unemployed (10=7%) search for bad jobs. This is the result of an endogenous
response of the unemployed to the competition for good jobs that they face with
employed seekers. Vacancies relative to the labor force (which is normalized to one)
are 7=5 percent for good jobs, and 15=6 percent for bad jobs.
The resulting match probabilities for ﬁrms are tj =0 =75 and te =0 =57, while
for workers the probabilities to be matched with a good or bad job are sj =0 =43
and se =0 =67. Similarly, the ﬂow of new good matches per period is 0=057 and for
new bad matches 0=092. The larger amount of bad matches reﬂects the fact that the
workers moving from bad to good jobs are replaced at the industry level.18 We ﬁnally
note that wages for good jobs are slightly higher than for bad jobs, the dierence
being roughly 4%.
5M o d e l A n a l y s i s
We ﬁrst discuss the business cycle statistics generated from a simulation of the model,
followed by a characterization of the economy’s response to a productivity shock. We
then analyse in detail the sources of the propagation and ampliﬁcation mechanism at
work in the model.
18The ﬂows in the bad job sector can be interpreted as either reﬂecting replacement hiring at
the ﬁrm level, or as job destruction in some ﬁrms, while others expand, holding total industry
employment steady.
135.1 Business Cycle Properties
We report labor market variables of interest in Table 3. Since the variance of the
technology shock was calibrated to match the standard deviation of U.S. GDP we
only evaluate the model’s predictions based on relative volatilities. We ﬁnd that, in
general, the variables in the model are only slightly less volatile than in the data,
in particular, vacancies, unemployment, and labor market tightness. Most notable,
however, is the large discrepancy between the standard measure of tightness  = y@x
and our alternative measure inclusive of on-the-job seekers, e  = y@(x + h).T h i s
suggests that on-the-job search has a signiﬁcant eect on the model’s propagation
mechanism, when compared to the standard framework, as labor market tightness is
the driving force behind ﬁrms’ vacancy posting decisions and wage setting outcomes.
To wit, the aggregate wage is substantially less volatile than in the data which
we interpret as endogenously generated inertia in the absence of any ad-hoc wage
stickiness mechanism. Similarly, the volatility of the quit rate comes very close to
what is observed in the data, which is a result of the highly responsive search intensity.
The supply of additional searchers holds the ratio of vacancies to unemployment and
employed search relatively stable. At the same time, it keeps the incentives high for
ﬁrms to post vacancies.
The simulation also yields strong predictions with respect to contemporaneous
correlations. First and foremost is the Beveridge curve, the negative correlation of
unemployment and vacancies over the business cycle. In U.S. data this correlation is
0=95, which are able to replicate fairly closely.19 We also match the negative comove-
ment of unemployment with all other aggregate variables of interest. For instance,
the unemployment rate is highly negatively, though not perfectly, correlated with the
job-to-job transition rate. When an adverse technology shock raises unemployment,
search intensity falls due to a declining job ﬁnding probability. Workers are therefore
less likely to engage in on-the-job search so that relatively fewer workers in bad jobs
move on to better ones. Interestingly, our two measures of labor market tightness
are perfectly correlated on account of the strong comovement of search intensity with
GDP. We also note the very high procylicality of job-to-job quits in terms of the
correlation with output. A noteworthy exception is the high correlation of wages and
on the job search in the model, in contrast to the data.
19For their model, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) report a correlation of only 0=26.S e ea l s o
the interesting discussion in Shimer (2005).
145.2 Impulse Responses
We illustrate the inﬂuence of on-the-job search on the model dynamics by using the
impulse responses reported in Figures 2 and 3. Consider a positive, one percent shock
to productivity. On impact, aggregate output rises with productivity, followed by a
protracted hump-shaped increase until three quarters after the shock. At the same
time, vacancies and labor market tightness for both job types rise. As the probability
of ﬁnding good jobs is now higher, search intensity, and with it the eective amount
of on-the-job searchers, h> jumps up. Vacancies for bad jobs rise by even more than
for good jobs, because ﬁrms anticipate the future ﬂows of workers to better jobs,
which will have to be replaced. Unemployment does not fall until the second period,
as it takes time for new matches to be formed. The unemployed redirect their search
activity to low quality jobs, as they react to the increased competition with employed
searchers.
In the periods after the shock, dierential eects unfold along various dimensions.
While good vacancies begin to fall from their new higher level, bad vacancies further
increase. This is due to the fact that as employment rises for both job types, more
workers leave bad jobs, requiring rising replacement hiring. Overall, the hiring rate
rises for several more quarters. Furthermore, search intensity continues to rise because
t h ef a l li nu n e m p l o y m e n ti n c r e a s e st h ec h a n c e so ft h ee m p l o y e dt ob em a t c h e dw i t h
good jobs even more. Employment in the good sector rises because the inﬂow of new
workers exceeds the outﬂow from job destruction.
Even though the standard measure of labor market tightness  = y@x is highly
volatile, wages rise by much less than without on-the-job search. The reason is that
the measures of labor market tightness relevant for the workers’ outside options that
enter wage bargaining, are substantially less volatile, as can be seen in Figure 3. The
wage in bad jobs rises by less, however, because of higher search intensity. While
search has a positive impact on the present value of the match for workers, it reduces
t h ev a l u eo ft h em a t c ht oﬁ r m s .
We see from the impulse responses that changes in productivity have persistent
eects, indicating that search on the job adds substantial propagation to the model.
Similarly, employment has a hump-shaped response. This is not caused per se by
the heterogeneity of jobs in the economy. Analysis of the model without employed
search, as in Krause and Lubik (2006), show that the impulse responses of that model
are very similar to those of a standard one-sector model, such as those by Andolfatto
15(1996) or Merz (1995).
5.3 Inspecting the Mechanism with On-the-Job Search
This sections digs deeper into the mechanism that generates the results of the model.
We argue that on-the-job search modiﬁes the standard model both in terms of ampli-
ﬁcation and propagation of productivity shocks in a qualitatively signiﬁcant manner.
5.3.1 Ampliﬁcation
Ampliﬁcation is most closely tied to the job creation condition (12) and the optimal
search condition (14). Rewrite the job creation condition for good jobs using the
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Our thought experiment is as follows. Suppose the expression on the right hand side
increases due to higher future productivity of jobs. This will cause ﬁrms to post more
vacancies until equality is restored. However, there is a contemporaneous eect of
higher vacancy creation to employed job search, which further feeds back to vacancy
creation.
The feedback between on-the-job search and vacancies can be deduced from in-
spection of the optimal search condition. Using the sectoral arbitrage condition for
















Since fj Af e the term in squared brackets is between zero and one. Movements in
labor market tightness in the good jobs sector explain all variation in search intensity.
An increase in vw in turn aects 
j












w h e r ew em a k eu s eo fhw = vwqe
w. Thus, for any increase in 
j
w mandated by the job
creation condition, higher vacancy creation increases the amount of job search as
implied by the optimal search condition. This lowers tightness, and vacancies will
therefore have to increase further to meet the job creation condition. Alternatively,
16for a given increase in labor market tightness, any increase in vacancies posted in
the good sector further increases in the search intensity of employed job seekers, by
virtue of A1. This in turn induces ﬁrms to post more vacancies. The process ends
due to the decreasing returns inherent in the cost of search.
There is a second feedback eect, which works through the search behavior of
the unemployed. On impact of an aggregate shock to productivity, which aects
both types of jobs, unemployed workers redirect their search eort to the bad job
sector. The reason is the increasing competition with employed searchers for good
jobs. Search for low quality jobs will be relatively more attractive. Furthermore, as
those who quit for good jobs will have to be replaced, additional vacancies are posted.
5.3.2 Propagation
The propagation mechanism of on-the-job search can be explained through the evo-
lution of unemployment. In the standard model, lower unemployment reduces ﬁrms’
incentives to post vacancies as fewer workers become available. With on-the-job
search, the fall in unemployment further raises the search activity of the employed.
This keeps vacancy postings higher than they otherwise would be. Adding the two
equations for the evolution of sectoral employment, the law of motion for total em-
ployment is:












Employment is increasing in the hiring rate s(
j
w). Moreover, for given xw search for
bad jobs rises with xe
w. Higher employment next period has a dampening inﬂuence,
as xw+1 =1 qw+1 is bound to be lower. However, as long as the hiring rate s(
j
w)
su!ciently rises, and xe
w does not fall, employment can rise further. Thus, the volatility
o ft h eh i r i n gr a t ei sc r u c i a lf o rp r o p a g a t i o n .
Employment in the sectors evolves according to:
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While next period’s employment in good jobs rises with the hiring rate and the number
of the unemployed searching for good jobs, employment in the bad jobs sector falls
with the amount of on-the-job search. As long as more of the unemployed search for
bad jobs than employed workers search for good jobs, employment can rise when the
17hiring rate rises. Whether this is the case depends on how much prices continue to
signal demand for the output of the low quality sector.
Propagation of the initial shock thus works through two channels. One is the fall
in unemployment that arises from the surge in hirings in the period after the shock.
The other is the continued need to replace the workers who are ﬂowing to high quality
jobs. With unemployment falling substantially, ever fewer workers are searching for
good jobs. Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, most of the decline in unemployment shows up
in the reduction in searchers for good jobs. In contrast, search for low quality jobs does
not fall. The falling competition with the unemployed keeps the match probability,
and thus the incentive to search on the job, high for employed job seekers.
6 Discussion and Robustness
We now discuss the robustness of the results with respect to aspects of the calibration
and to a number of extensions, speciﬁcally the calibration of the search elasticity and
endogenous intensity of unemployed search.
6.1 The Role of Search Intensity
Why does the cyclicality of job-to-job quits change the behavior of the economy so
substantially? This is best understood as the result of an interaction between rising
search eort and the heterogeneity of vacancy postings. On the one hand, rising search
eort raises good ﬁrms’ incentives to post vacancies. Without employed searchers, the
creation of good jobs is constrained by the fall in the number of unemployed searchers
and the strong rise in wages. On the other hand, the increasing availability of good
jobs further encourages on-the-job search. Thus a small rise in productivity leads to
large changes in the incentives to search and posting vacancies, which explains that
unemployment falls substantially even though competition with employed job seekers
rises. Only slowly do these incentives fall back to their steady state levels.
The role of search intensity can be illustrated by varying the elasticity of search
eort. The results are depicted in Figure 4, which shows the standard deviation of
measures of labor market tightness and the quit rate. As  approaches one from
above, the quit rate and labor market tightness become exceedingly volatile. Since
the responsiveness of search costs to changing search eort declines, the volatility of
job-to-job quits rises. Even though the standard and our modiﬁed measures of labor
18market tightness,  = y@x and e  = y@(x + h), are almost perfectly correlated, their
volatility is strikingly dierent. While the former is very responsive to changes in
, the latter is barely aected. The reason is that as unemployment falls, employed
search rises, keeping the incentives for vacancy creation high after a favorable aggre-
gate shock. The theoretical counterpart in our model, yj@(xj +h)> behaves similarly.
As is evident from the impulse responses, the presence of time-varying on-the-job
search activity leads to persistent movements of output after shocks to technology.
The elasticity of search is, however, only partially responsible for the propagation
mechanism in the model. Even with ﬁxed search intensity, productivity shocks are
still ampliﬁed and propagated in a hump-shaped manner. At the same time, the
volatility of vacancies and unemployment falls, as Figure 3 illustrates.
We investigate this issue further by analyzing modiﬁcations to our benchmark
speciﬁcation. The impulse response of output is depicted in Figure 5. First, we shut
down on-the-job search over the business cycle. That is, we impose vw = v, ;w. While
there is still employed search in the steady state - and optimally chosen according
to Eq. (14) -, workers are not allowed to adapt their search intensity to changing
business cycle conditions. Secondly, we remove the possibility of on-the-job search
entirely, thereby only preserving the two-sector, good job/bad job structure. We see
clearly the complete lack of propagation in the standard search and matching model.20
The endogenous persistence due to on-the-job search is therefore helpful in explain-
ing the autocorrelation patterns in U.S. data. Figure 6 depicts the autocorrelation
functions of U.S. GDP growth rates over the period 1948:1-2002:4 and for the three
model speciﬁcations discussed above. The lack of propagation in the model with-
out on-the-job search is well documented by a ﬂat autocorrelation function around
zero. The benchmark model, on the other hand, captures U.S. output dynamics re-
markably well, even slightly overpredicting the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation. But even
when search intensity is constant, the autocorrelation pattern by far outperforms the
standard model without on-the-job search.21
20It is this inability of the search and matching model that has been widely discussed in the
literature (see, for instance, Den Haan et. al., 2000).
21Inclusion of capital is likely to further increase the autocorrelation of output in addition to that
achieved by on-the-job search.
196.2 Endogenous Search Intensity of the Unemployed
In the model, the key mechanism is the increasing ﬂow and search activity of employed
job seekers. At the same time, the search intensity of unemployed workers is ﬁxed. We
argue that this asymmetry does not generate our results. Conceivably, as unemployed
search activity rises, their incentives to search for good jobs stay high, thus competing
more strongly with the employed searchers. In one-sector models with endogenous
search activity (Merz, 1995) this element tends to worsen model performance. In
our on-the-job search framework, the mechanism that expands search on-the-job is
the fall in unemployment. If unemployed workers were to search more intensively, the
unemployment pool would deplete even faster, thus further amplifying the importance
of search for employed workers.
It is fairly straightforward to include endogenous search intensity of the unem-
ployed in the baseline model. The asset value of unemployment becomes:
X
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Arbitrage between sectors implies that vxl
w = vx


























As for employed search, search intensity of the unemployed is directly proportional
to labor market tightness for good jobs. Furthermore, dividing the conditions for














Assuming the same search cost functions, this condition implies that employed and
unemployed search intensity move proportionately in response to shocks.
First note that higher endogenous search of the unemployed raises the eective
search of the unemployed. Deﬁne xw = vx
w(1qw). But its composition is not obvious
since xw = x
j
w + xe
w. If anything, changes in employment are further ampliﬁed, as can
be seen from the employment equation:












20xw rises, too, as does xe
w.F o r g i v e n 
j
w> employment will rise faster. While this may
reduce the periods in which employment and output further rise, it does amplify the
impact of the shock. It is not the case that endogenous search of the unemployed
w o r k sa g a i n s tt h ee ects of on-the-job search.
6.3 Wage Setting Arrangements and Real Wage Rigidity
For expositional clarity, we excluded the possibility that employed workers who con-
tact a good ﬁrm may be in a stronger bargaining position. As long as the previous











w AX w= The superscripts ‘h’a n d‘ x’ indicate the dierent
values for Z
j
w when workers fallbacks dier. Since there is continuous renegotiation,
the wages accruing to the worker would fall next period, as the worker cannot return
t ot h ep r e v i o u sj o b . T h u st h ed i erence in value during negotiations must be paid
lump sum. Such a ‘signing bonus’ above the wage normally negotiated would have
to be Ew = Ze
w  Xw=22
As i g n i n gb o n u sh a st w oe ects on the equilibrium. On the one hand, it increases
the incentive for employed workers to search. The higher search intensity would
somewhat reduce the value of bad jobs, and thus lower Ze
w = On the other hand, good
ﬁrms who can not distinguish between unemployed and employed workers before
contacting them. Therefore, ceteris paribus, vacancies posted would fall due to the
probability of having to pay the bonus. This would dominate rejecting the worker
and searching another period. How these two eects aect the cyclical response to
shocks is not clear, even if they reduce on balance the amount of job-to-job ﬂows.
A second issue is whether turnover can be reduced by higher wages. Such an
‘e!ciency wage’ may be pareto improving, since the reduction in turnover increases
the total value of the match. The simple surplus splitting would no longer be equiv-
alent the Nash bargaining solution, which postulates pareto optimality and a convex
bargaining set. However, note that this problem does not arise in our model, because
ﬁrms cannot ae c tt h ec u r r e n tm a t c hv a l u eb yo ering a higher wage now. The rea-
son is that workers search behavior is governed by returns to search which accrue
only in the next period. Thus the ﬁrm should commit to higher wages in the future.
22We assume here that the previous employer does not make counter-oers, which is not plausible
on empirical ground and has been argued not to be in the interest of ﬁrms. See Moscarini (2005)
and for example, Christensen et al. (2005). But note that Cahuc et al. (2005) use exactly such
setup to derive a theory of the wage distribution.
21With continuous renegotiation, such a commitment cannot be made. Therefore the
bargaining set under this assumption is convex and current wage increases are not
pareto-improving, so the Nash bargaining solution remains applicable. Only if we
were to allow for (at least one-period) wage stickiness can a higher wage in the next
period aect turnover decisions today.23
Wage rigidity would not only potentially give rise to ‘e!ciency wages’ but also
substantially aect the dynamics of the model. It would complement the ampliﬁcation
of vacancies and unemployment and the propagation of shocks. This follows for the
reasons emphasized by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005): rigid wages for new hires keeps
the incentives for ﬁrms to post vacancies higher as a tightening labor market does not
feed back into wages. The volatility of wages, which is already lower in our model with
on-the-job search, could be reduced with smaller degrees of real wage rigidity than in
the standard model. But the eects of on-the-job search would not be aected.
7 Relation to Previous Work
In many other models, employed search is mainly varied at the extensive margin and
possibly a lump sum is paid for searching. Recent contribution along these lines are
Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, Robin (2005), Nagypal (2005), and Moscarini (2005). Pissarides
(2000) is an early example for this modeling strategy. Jobs dier by idiosyncratic
productivity levels, drawn from a continuous distribution. With workers choosing
whether to search or not, this implies two thresholds in terms of productivity. Be-
low the higher threshold workers have an incentive to search for better employment,
participating in the common matching market. New matches start at the highest
possible productivity. Below the second threshold, the joint value of the match with
the ﬁrm is below the parties’ outside option, leading to job destruction. Since all jobs
are created at the highest possible productivity level, vacancies are the same for em-
ployed and unemployed workers. The key dierence of our model is the search at the
intensive margin, and the persistent dierence between job types. Including persis-
tent idiosyncratic shocks in a business cycle model of this type comes at considerable
computational costs.24
Pissarides’ (1994) search model with on-the-job search shares the presence of two
23See Shimer (2006) for a discussion of wage setting in the presence of on-the-job search, and the
nature of pareto-improving wage setting when ﬁrms can commit to future wage payments.
24See Hussey (2005) for such a model.
22dierent job types, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ with ours, and features random search for jobs.
An interesting feature is the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. Just as idiosyn-
cratic productivity draws, this generates heterogeneity in worker productivities across
jobs. Implied is also a threshold in the tenure of workers above which workers do not
switch jobs, because starting wages in good jobs are lower than the wage in bad jobs.
Thus search is also at the extensive margin, search intensity is constant. Furthermore,
relative prices and the interest rate are constant. In Pissarides’ model employed job
search reduces the volatility of unemployment. Thus this model would not help un-
derstand the Hall-Shimer ﬁndings of a substantial volatility of the unemployment
rate.
Mortensen (1994) simulates a stochastic version of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994)
model, with the addition of on-the-job search, modeled at the extensive margin. The
presence of employed search helps in explaining the negative correlation between job
creation and destruction. The model also features a procyclical quit rate, with work-
ers being randomly matched to the most productive jobs. Both Pissarides (1994,
2000) and Mortensen do not explore prediction of their models for the joint dynamics
of vacancies, unemployment and job-to-job ﬂows or the eects on wages.
A second class of models with on-the-job search consider the possibility of en-
dogenous wage distributions arising in the presence of frictions.25 However, these
models are steady state models, and are based on wage posting. This means that
wages do not respond to shocks and are not renegotiated. Burdett and Mortensen
(1999) explore the link with inter-industry and ﬁrm-size wage dierentials. Cahuc,
Postel-Vinay, Robin (1999) estimate such a model and show how it accounts for a
steady state distribution of wages. Christensen et al. (2005) estimate a similar model
with endogenous intensity of search. We do not know of any example in the literature
that analyses dynamic, that is, stochastic versions of these models.26
A ﬁnal note on the literature that confronted the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
model with the data. It typically focused on the performance of the model along the
dimension it was designed to explain, namely the behavior of job creation and de-
struction. For example, Cole and Rogerson (1999) ﬁnd that the model performs well
i ft h es t e a d y - s t a t eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ei sh i g h .T h ea r g u m e n ti st h a tt h er e l e v a n tp o o l
of searchers in the labor market is high, based on the ﬁndings of Blanchard and Di-
25A key reference is Mortensen (2003).
26See also Shimer (2005) who reports that no such analysis has been conducted.
23amond (1990). Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) achieve plausible job ﬂows by
modeling endogenous job destruction along with capital. As mentioned, Hall (2003)
and Shimer (2003) are the ﬁrst to consider the ability of the search and matching
framework to quantitatively match the cyclical behavior of unemployment and va-
cancies. In all papers, the performance of the model is enhanced by an assumption
that reduces the cyclicality of hiring costs or wages. In our model, it is the presence
of employed search.
8C o n c l u s i o n
We have presented a model of labor market and aggregate dynamics and in which
search on-the-job plays a crucial role. It is possible to explain the joint dynamics
of vacancies, unemployment, and productivity without resorting to any imperfection
other than search and matching frictions. In particular, we do not require wages to
be rigid in order to bring the model closer to the data. Instead, in a cyclical upswing,
increased search eort by employed workers serves to hold their outside options tame,
and keeps costs of job creation more stable for ﬁrms. Endogenously, wages are less
volatile, and incentives to post vacancies remain high. Unemployed workers incentive
to direct search to jobs where they do not compete with employed searchers further
amplify these eects.
The model delivers a rich description of the labor market over the business cycle.
Booms are times which allow employed workers to upgrade into better jobs, while
opening jobs for unemployed workers, albeit of lower quality. The reallocation of labor
to more productive units is facilitated by direct job-to-job transitions, rather than
requiring movements of workers through the unemployment pool.27 One fundamental
reason for worker mobility is the heterogeneity of jobs which gives rise to persistent
dierences in the returns to workers. The creation of good jobs is ampliﬁed by the
rising intensity of search by employed workers.
The propagation that the model implies may have important implications for busi-
ness cycle analysis. In the response to a positive productivity shock, output peaked
27Ad i erent interpretation of the demand structure also comes to mind. The good job-bad job
distinction might better be reﬂecting old and new jobs in a vintage model. In that case, search on
the job could accelerate the creation of new vintages at the technological frontier. It would also
induce destruction of less productive units, with dierent implications for the e!ciency of creative
destruction. See Caballero and Hammour (1995).
24after a number of quarters, not in the ﬁrst period, as the process for productivity
suggests. A higher match probability induces employed workers to search for better
jobs. This feeds back into the incentives for ﬁrms to continue posting vacancies for
a protracted period. Falling unemployment further reduces the competition for good
jobs and keeps incentives for search high. Only slowly does this eect appear to fade.
Interestingly, we obtain a propagation of shocks that is similar to Den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000), even though we do not include capital or a variable destruction
rate.
However, the ﬁndings are not meant to rule out an potentially important role
for (real) wage rigidity. Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) suggest this as a solution
to the empirical di!culties they identiﬁed with Mortensen-Pissarides model. Also
in our model, wage rigidity would further amplify the cyclical response of vacancies,
unemployment and job-to-job ﬂows. Hall (2005) has made an interesting advance
modeling wage setting based on social norms, which allows wages even for new hires
to be rigid. In previous work, we applied this idea in a monetary business cycle
m o d e lw i t hs e a r c hf r i c t i o n s . 28 The model can also be seen as complementary to work
by Nagypal (2005), in which on-the-job search is motivated by workers’ perceived
match quality. Booms are times where workers are more willing to move to other jobs
because of the increased likelihood of ﬁnding a better match (independent of actual
productivity). This in turn increases the incentives for ﬁrms to post vacancies.
28Krause and Lubik (2007).
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4. Evolution of employment:
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10. Sectoral and aggregate output:
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32Table 2: Model Parameters and Calibration
Parameter Value Description
 0.4 Match Elasticity
Pj 0.6 Level Parameter
Pe 0.6 Level Parameter
fj 0.16 Good Job Creation Cost
fe 0.04 Bad Job Creation Cost
 0.1 Separation Rate
 1.1 Search Elasticity
 0.5 Nash Bargaining Share
 0.4 CES-Weight
 0.98 Discount Factor
 1 Intertemporal Substitution Elasticity
x 0.12 Unemployment Rate
 0.06 Quit Rate
} 0.39 Value of Home Production
 0.04 Search Cost Function Parameter
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Figure 1: Vacancies, Unemployment and Quits
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Productivity Shock



















































































































Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions to a 1% Productivity Shock







































Figure 4: Search Elasticity and Aggregate Volatilities


























Figure 5: Impulse Responses of Output to a 1% Productivity Shock
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